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Language
English (en)
Date of Award
5-6-2014
Author's Department
International and Area Studies
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts (A.B.)
Restricted/Unrestricted
Restricted
Abstract
Developed nations operate with certain economic and political institutions that allow and reinforce positive long-term economic outcomes. Yet, impoverished nations often lack the institutions necessary for similar sustained development. The question then becomes, how do poor nations gain good institutions? It can occur through revolutions, sweeping change that holds the potential to replace corrupted institutions. However, positive institutional change can also occur through a more gradual, potentially less violent process if guided by motivated leadership. This leadership is most often democratic in nature, but on several rare occasions in recent history, constructive transformation has been promoted by autocratic leaders. This work proposes a theory to understand the underlying motivation as well as the methodology utilized by autocrats to achieve institutional change. Relying on select theories from political philosophy, most notably Niccolo Machiavelli’s concept of ‘virtue,’ as well as the incentive-based perspective of the field of neo-institutionalism and borrowing heavily from the work of Mancur Olson, Daron Acemoglu, and James Robinson, it is argued that context-specific institutional arrangements allow ‘virtuous’ autocrats to follow a long-term incentive structure, which advocates the pursuit of growth-inducing policy. Asa result, these autocrats prioritize growth over their own immediate economic gain, giving rise to the possibility of positive institutional improvements. Mitigating factors then determine the relative success of these endeavors. The representative regimes of Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Park Chung-hee in South Korea are examined as case studies. Finally, an original analysis of the modern history of Tunisia implements the model within sub-periods of Tunisian history, serving to re-enforce previous conclusions established by the Chilean and South Korean case studies.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.7936/58vw-e703
Mentor
Andrew Sobel
Additional Advisors
Frank Lovett
Recommended Citation
Goldstein, Daniel Alexander Novick, "Institutional Autocracy in Developing Nations: A Theoretical Model of Transformative Dictatorship" (2014). Senior Honors Papers / Undergraduate Theses. 155.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.7936/58vw-e703
Comments
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