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Language

English (en)

Date of Award

2017

Author's School

College of Arts & Sciences

Author's Department

International and Area Studies

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts (A.B.)

Restricted/Unrestricted

Restricted

Abstract

In a speech before parliament in May 1946, Syrian Prime Minister Sa’dallah al-Jabiri proposed a series of policy reforms, including more state-planned economic development and “radical changes” to administration. These reforms, he hoped, would resolve many of the Syrian state’s difficulties in its newfound independence. Jabiri said that the problems Syria faced amounted to “a technical struggle”, which required the expertise of “technical experts from all foreign countries.” Jabiri announced, further, that his government would begin widespread hiring of these foreign advisers, experts, and technicians to staff state departments. A few weeks later, Lebanese Prime Minister Saadi Munla similarly announced that he planned on “appointing foreign experts in all government departments.” Jabiri’s term “technical struggle” implicitly asserted that the country’s post-independence challenges were a matter not for political debate, but for technocratic expert consideration. Skilled experts and technicians, brought in from abroad, would suffice to rectify the economic and administrative problems of independence. The end of the French Mandate in the mid-1940s had thrown the responsibilities of governance onto the newly independent republics of Syria and Lebanon. These governments turned to foreign powers for assistance in consolidating control of institutions that had previously been under French administration. This assistance came primarily came in the form of administrative and scientific personnel to work in Syria and Lebanon’s employ. Under titles like “expert”, “adviser”, and “technician”, these foreigners took up work reforming state administration and planning economic development programs. Far from neutral technocrats, however, these foreign experts and advisers had a critical role in the political struggles of the Levantine independence era. Independence in the Middle East, and the Levant in particular, was not a singular accomplishment but a long process whose course was contested by domestic interest groups and foreign powers. The independence of Lebanon and Syria at the end of the French Mandate in 1943 was tenuous, facing challenges of governance, a bad economic situation, and competing visions of independence and competing nationalisms. As the French Mandate had created both countries, Syrian and Lebanese national identity was still in dispute. The Lebanese and Syrian national governments had nominal independence, but found their options for development limited by the pressures of domestic opposition and the institutional legacies of the French Mandate. The new national governments sought foreign support, particularly in the form of experts and advisers, as a way to develop strong states whose policies fit their interests.

Mentor

Timothy Parsons

Comments

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